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Abstract
Political dialogue among citizens offers numerous potential contributions to American politics, but
attainment of these benefits hinges largely on the extent to which conversations cross lines of political
difference. In what contexts are cross-cutting interactions most likely to thrive? Using data from five surveys,
we find consistent evidence that the workplace is the social context best positioned to facilitate cross-cutting
political discourse. Political discussion in the workplace involves a large number of discussants, and it involves
greater exposure to people of dissimilar perspectives than does discussion in contexts such as the family, the
neighborhood, or the voluntary association. We next consider whether workplace-based interactions are
capable of producing beneficial effects. Despite the notoriously weak nature of work-based social ties, we find
evidence that workplace-based exposure to differing political views increases people’s knowledge of rationales
for political perspectives other than their own and also fosters political tolerance.
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The Workplace as a Context for Cross-Cutting
Political Discourse
Diana C. Mutz University of Pennsylvania
Jeffery J. Mondak University of Illinois
Political dialogue among citizens offers numerous potential contributions to American politics, but attainment of
these benefits hinges largely on the extent to which conversations cross lines of political difference. In what contexts
are cross-cutting interactions most likely to thrive? Using data from five surveys, we find consistent evidence that
the workplace is the social context best positioned to facilitate cross-cutting political discourse. Political discussion
in the workplace involves a large number of discussants, and it involves greater exposure to people of dissimilar per-
spectives than does discussion in contexts such as the family, the neighborhood, or the voluntary association. We
next consider whether workplace-based interactions are capable of producing beneficial effects. Despite the notori-
ously weak nature of work-based social ties, we find evidence that workplace-based exposure to differing political
views increases people’s knowledge of rationales for political perspectives other than their own and also fosters polit-
ical tolerance.
Contexts for Cross-Cutting
Conversation
“It is hardly possible,” John Stuart Mill observed, “to
overstate the value . . . of placing human beings 
in contact with other persons dissimilar to them-
selves, and with modes of thought and action 
unlike those with which they are familiar” (Mill 
1848, 594). Although Mill wrote over a century 
ago, observers of contemporary American political
culture are similarly concerned about the extent 
to which citizens control what they see and hear,
and with whom they associate, reducing opportuni-
ties for cross-cutting conversation (e.g., Sunstein
2001). Many believe that face-to-face exposure to 
differing views may be waning. Activities that 
once required face-to-face interaction can now be
accomplished by other means, from banking via 
automatic teller to shopping over the internet. These
new modes of activity produce fewer chance encoun-
ters in the course of day-to-day life, the very kinds 
of encounters most likely to expose people to those
unlike themselves.
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bservers of American culture often lament 
the disappearance of social contexts in which
political discussion transpires. The street
corner and public park conjure up nostalgic images of
citizens exchanging views in the course of their every-
day lives and learning about differences of opinion
within their communities. Such encounters with
people of dissimilar viewpoints are widely believed to
serve an important function in democratic societies.
So where is it that political discussion of this kind
takes place? Our findings suggest that in the contem-
porary United States, conversations across lines of
political difference occur with the greatest regularity
in the workplace. Moreover, there are beneficial soci-
etal consequences that flow from the cross-cutting
conversation engendered by participation in the
workforce.1 In the sections that follow, we first present
the theoretical rationale for why the workplace may
encourage cross-cutting conversations about politics.
We follow this discussion with empirical evidence of
the distinctiveness of the American workplace as a
context for political discussion. Finally, we document
some beneficial effects of workplace-based political
discussion.
1Our focus in this article is on the workplace as a context for cross-cutting discourse and especially on the political consequences of expo-
sure to political diversity. The potential political significance of the workplace is surely not limited to the effects considered here. For
instance, exposure to social or demographic diversity at work brings a different array of consequences (see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000).
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For a social context to foster cross-cutting politi-
cal discussion, three requirements must be met. First,
and most obviously, the context must supply poten-
tial discussion partners. Second, these discussants
must converse, particularly about politics. Chance
meetings take place in the movie theater and the
concert hall, for example, but these fleeting encoun-
ters rarely give rise to political discussion. Third, when
conversations about politics do take place, to be espe-
cially valuable they must, as Mill argued, cross lines 
of difference. Discussion partners must hold differing
views and be willing and able to communicate those
differences to one another.
In the early 1900s, John Dewey (1927, 212) argued
that “ties formed by sharing in common work” were
unique among human relationships in many respects.
Several features of work-based social interactions may
give the workplace advantages as a context for cross-
cutting conversation relative to contexts such as the
voluntary association, the neighborhood, and the
church. People spend relatively few hours in the pres-
ence of others in these alternate contexts. When polit-
ical discussion does transpire in these other contexts,
it may fail to cross lines of difference. Homogeneity in
the voluntary association, church, or neighborhood
may occur due either to the impact of self-selection
on entry into the context, or as a result of conformity
or persuasion within those social contexts, or from
norms against the expression of dissent. In addition,
because one’s presence in contexts such as churches
and associations is voluntary, the capacity to avoid
exposure to dissonant political views—to change the
subject, to speak with someone else, or to just walk
away—is considerable.
For each of the alternate contexts, there are
reasons to believe its capacity for fostering cross-
cutting exchange is limited. For instance, an increas-
ing number of residential communities promote
self-selection on the basis of shared values and
lifestyles, thus limiting exposure to dissimilar political
views among one’s neighbors (e.g., Blakely and Snyder
1997; Frey 1995). Levels of political homogeneity
within churches tend to be the same as within neigh-
borhoods, and the political climates of the neighbor-
hood and the church are most often mutually
reinforcing (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Politically
consequential social interaction does occur within
places of worship, but the capacity of the church to
sustain cross-cutting political discourse is more ques-
tionable because one effect of interaction within the
church is increasing attitudinal homogeneity.
It is easy to see potential limitations of other social
contexts, but does the workplace possess any unique
advantages? Unfortunately, the workplace is the least
studied social context in terms of its potential impact
on political behavior (e.g., Books and Prysby 1991;
Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Lafferty 1989; Putnam 2000),
and no past research has directly examined the attrib-
utes of the workplace as a context for cross-cutting
political discourse. Nonetheless, indirect suggestions
of potential benefits of the workplace can be identi-
fied in many previous studies.
First, interpersonal contact flourishes at work.
Most American adults are employed, most workers
spend more time on the job than in the neighborhood
or in organizations, and virtually all jobs require
contact with coworkers or customers. Studies of per-
sonal relationships point to the workplace as impor-
tant for social interaction (Hodson 2004) and the
formation of social networks (Fine 1986) and as a key
source of social support in times of personal crisis
(Adelman, Parks, and Albrecht 1987). Moreover, polit-
ical discussion is enhanced by being in the labor force
(Straits 1991), and political discussion is associated
with working outside the home (Burstein 1972). Pat-
terns of sociability increasingly center on workplace
connections (Poarch 1997), and people report
knowing people at work better than people in their
own neighborhoods (Wuthnow 1999).
In addition, the balkanizing influence of self-
selection cannot operate in the workplace to the same
extent as in residential selection, group membership,
or church attendance. Most people work out of neces-
sity rather than by choice, and workers generally
cannot choose their coworkers and customers in the
same manner that they can pick a neighborhood or a
church. As Neuberger observes, in the workplace,
“Encounters and relationships are unavoidable: it is
impossible to simply ‘keep out of the way’ of certain
people even if they have not selected each other”
(1996, 272; see also Auhagen and von Salisch 1996;
Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert 1986; Derlega and
Winstead 1986). Further, the degree of demographic
diversity in the workplace exceeds that of most resi-
dential areas, making it a more likely context for
encountering dissimilar others.
Moreover, politics is a quintessentially “public”
conversational topic, much like sports and popular
television programs, making it well suited to noninti-
mate conversations among coworkers. Based on face-
to-face interviews with 200 middle-class Americans,
Poarch concurs that work serves as an important
social context for public dialogue: “When people
brought up stories from their work, it was most often
in the context of discussing experiences or conversa-
tions which informed their ideas about public issues
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and the common good (rather than private matters)”
(1997, 181).
Beyond these characteristics, a number of con-
temporary trends in workplace organization may be
encouraging more conversations among those of dif-
fering perspectives. Emphasis on cultivating “human
capital,” coupled with new methods of organizing pro-
duction and managing workers, may function to erase
boundaries that once insulated workers from those
with backgrounds unlike their own (Cohen and
Prusak 2001; Whitman 1999). Management styles
have moved away from the hierarchical Taylorist
model, and now put greater emphasis on interaction
and communication between individuals working
together in nonhierarchical teams (Chilton and Wei-
denbaum 1994, Louis and Yan 1996; Peters 1992). The
American workplace also has become more tolerant of
various personal characteristics and lifestyles, and this
has been reflected in policies addressing promotions,
benefits, and dress codes (Whitman 1999). As Thomas
advises, “The thrust of today’s nonhierarchical, flexi-
ble, collaborative management requires a ten- or
twenty-fold increase in our tolerance for individual-
ity” (1990, 112).
Research in political science has demonstrated 
the political significance of social interaction, and
research in sociology has identified the workplace as 
a unique context for social activity, but few scholars
have linked these perspectives (but see Lipset, Trow,
and Coleman 1956 for an early exception). Nonethe-
less, a few studies involving subnational samples have
hinted at the workplace’s importance for political dis-
cussion. Finifter (1974) studied social influence in
work groups at Michigan auto plants. She found that
auto workers talked about politics much more at work
than in any other context, including among nonwork
friends, in voluntary groups, among neighbors, and
with relatives.2 Likewise, in a survey asking Ohioans
about their discussions of the 1988 campaign, Beck
(1991) found they were most likely to have such dis-
cussions with spouses and coworkers and least 
likely with neighbors (cf. Wyatt, Katz, and Kim 2000;
Wyatt et al. 1996). Banaszak and Leighley (1991)
found that the work-related social context had a sig-
nificant impact on women’s attitudes toward the
women’s movement, changes in attitudes that were
not transmitted through neighborhoods. In a study of
three American communities and three British com-
munities, Conover, Searing, and Crewe (2002) noted
that public discussions of politics were most common
at work and in neighborhoods. Mutz and Martin
(2001) found that the workplace involved greater
political diversity on average than voluntary associa-
tions. And finally, Huckfeldt and colleagues (1995)
report a significant positive coefficient for discussants
who are coworkers in their regression equation pre-
dicting the frequency of discussion within network
dyads.
Viewed collectively, the research examined here
offers a strong case regarding the potential of the
workplace to foster cross-cutting political discourse.
Nonetheless, some have treated this hypothesis with
skepticism, because they assume that politics is basi-
cally “off limits” as a topic of conversation at work. As
Rosenberg noted in the 1950s, talking about politics
can pose threats to an individual’s occupational
success:
The man engaged in commerce cannot afford to alienate
either Democrats or Republicans; in this sense business
is not merely apolitical but anti-political. Similarly an
employer may be reluctant to alienate his workers, and a
worker may be unwilling to jeopardize his job, in defense
of his political principles. These factors may be extremely
significant deterrents to the free expression of political
ideas. (1954–55, 353)
Consistent with this view, some argue that we should
not expect much from the workplace in fostering
public discourse. For example, citing evidence of
decreasing job security, Putnam dismisses the possi-
bility that “water cooler” discussions of public affairs
could serve as the equivalent of a “town square” for
political conversation (2000, 92). Our review suggests
that this dismissal may be premature. Likewise, recent
research by Hodson (2004) establishes that rich social
lives abound at work and that social interaction is not
dampened by workers’ concerns over job security. To
what extent those interactions involve political dis-
cussion remains to be seen.
Our interest in the capacity of the workplace to
serve as a context for cross-cutting political conversa-
tion presupposes that such conversations are of value.
2Finifter also reports that political deviants in the workplace she
studied (i.e., Republicans) tended to choose friends within their
work groups who shared their partisan attitudes, thus selectivity
was found even at work. This result does not undercut our argu-
ment that the workplace, viewed relative to other social contexts,
fosters exposure to diverse perspectives. Regardless of self-
selection based on political similarity, most workers still engage in
prolonged interaction with casual acquaintances. Also, the effect
Finifter identified took place among workers who were an extreme
minority in a highly politicized context—Republicans in 1960s
Detroit auto factories. In a study with data from more politically
heterogeneous work sites, Mondak and Mutz (2001) found no 
evidence that workers select discussion partners on the basis of
shared partisanship. Instead, the partisanship of discussion part-
ners was related to the partisan composition of the work site as a
whole, a finding consistent with Huckfeldt and Sprague’s (1995)
claim that the choice of a discussion partner is partly the result of
a stochastic process.
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One often-proposed consequence is a greater aware-
ness of the bases for other viewpoints. If people’s 
horizons narrow through strictly like-minded interac-
tions, polarization and extremism may result from a
lack of understanding of multiple political perspec-
tives (Sunstein 2001). Contact with people of differ-
ing views is also seen as essential to the perception of
a legitimate opposition (Benhabib 1996) and to polit-
ical tolerance. Borhek’s theory of incongruent experi-
ence posits that tolerance is “the result of experiences
which are characterized by heterogeneity of ideas or
direct or vicarious exposure to other ways of life and
other ways of defining situations” (1965, 89). This
theory leads him to the hypothesis that social expo-
sure to incongruent views will be positively related to
political tolerance.
Evidence documenting benefits from exposure to
incongruent ideas remains relatively thin, particularly
evidence specific to the possible consequences of
workplace-based political conversation. Nonetheless,
workplace-based interactions have been used by some
as a post hoc explanation for why certain demo-
graphic groups are more tolerant than others. For
example, Nunn, Crockett, and Williams speculate that
men are more tolerant than women because of differ-
ences in the extent of work-life experience: “Practi-
cally all men work outside the home and thus are
more likely than women to be exposed to the sorts of
diversity that enhance tolerance in the course of their
day to day lives” (1978, 115; see also Stouffer 1955).
Likewise, Rose (1952) suggested that interaction
among members of a union contributed to more pos-
itive attitudes toward minority groups. Unfortunately,
the hypothesis linking social contact in the workplace
to political tolerance through cross-cutting interac-
tions has yet to be tested using multivariate analyses.
Further, some claims regarding work and tolerance
suggest that workplace interactions should decrease
political tolerance because of the workplace’s hierar-
chical, authoritarian organizational structure (e.g.,
Korman 1971; Sutton and Porter 1968). Still others
have argued that workplace-based discourse is
unlikely to result in either positive or negative effects
due simply to the weak nature of these social ties
(Putnam 2000).
In the analyses that follow, we first examine
whether conversations across lines of political differ-
ence do, in fact, flourish at work. We then explore the
possibility that encountering disagreement in work-
place discussion networks yields specific tangible ben-
efits, with focus on two of the consequences addressed
above, tolerance and awareness of the rationales for
opposing issue positions.
Study Design
We draw on a 1996 national survey funded by the
Spencer Foundation, Huckfeldt and Sprague’s (1995)
data on discussion networks in South Bend, Indiana
in 1984, the U.S. component of the 1992 Cross
National Election Project (CNEP), the 1985 and 1987
General Social Surveys (GSS), and the 2000 National
Election Study (NES).3 These data sets are useful for
examining political discussion in the workplace
because all include social network questions in which
people are asked to identify others with whom they
discuss politics or, in the case of the GSS, people with
whom they discuss “important problems.” This means
that the measures described below reveal actual polit-
ical discussion in the workplace and elsewhere, not
merely the potential for such discussion to occur.
Items used to identify discussants varied slightly from
study to study, as did the categories used to identify
the origins of these discussants and the extent to
which their views were similar to or different from
those of the respondent. Nonetheless, each of these
studies tells a remarkably similar story.
Each survey included items exploring respon-
dents’ relationships with several discussion partners.
These batteries varied in three important respects.
First, three surveys identified up to three discussants
per respondent, versus four discussants on the 2000
NES and five on the 1985 GSS and 1992 CNEP.
Second, the GSS surveys prompted respondents to
name individuals with whom they discussed “impor-
tant problems,” while the CNEP asked about people
with whom they talked about “important matters” for
the first four discussants and about a campaign dis-
cussant for the fifth, and the South Bend, Spencer, and
NES surveys focused explicitly on political discussants.
A third difference concerns the categories used to
identify sources of discussants. Many of the categories
refer to physical contexts such as the workplace, the
neighborhood, groups, and the church. But in some
of the surveys, additional categories are nebulous with
respect to context, such as “met through relatives.”
Taking these minor differences into account, we
looked for a consistent pattern regarding the hypoth-
esis that the workplace is a vital source of the kind of
political discussion argued to be most important.
These data made it possible to test our first
hypothesis with three data sets that included all of the
necessary measures for evaluating how much cross-
3An appendix in which coding of our key variables is described
appears on the Journal of Politics web site, http://www.journal
ofpolitics.org.
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cutting political conversation goes on in each context
(South Bend, Spencer, and CNEP). Three additional
data sets provide partial information, and thus are
useful for establishing a consistent overall pattern
(1985 GSS, 1987 GSS, 2000 NES). For purposes of
testing our second hypothesis, that this kind of work-
place-based political talk has consequences, the com-
bination of independent and dependent variables
available in the Spencer and GSS data made possible
five independent tests of possible consequences.
We began testing our hypotheses by determining
in which social contexts dyads are more likely to
involve cross-cutting political discussion. Next, we
combined these dyad-level measures to create indica-
tors of the amount of cross-cutting political discus-
sion each respondent encountered through work. We
then used these individual-level measures to examine
whether workplace-based cross-cutting discussion has
any of the beneficial consequences typically attributed
to cross-cutting conversations in more conventional
contexts for political interaction.
Where Do Americans Encounter
Cross-Cutting Political Views?
To address our first research question, Table 1 
examines the prevalence of cross-cutting political dis-
cussion across social contexts, primarily using dyads
as the unit of analysis. The far right column in Table
1 summarizes the average extent of individual-level
cross-cutting political discussion at work relative to
other social contexts. The indicators in the preceding
columns detail the construction of the summary
measure and provide insight into why the workplace
stands out in this regard.
To address the hypothesis that the workplace is
uniquely important for conversations involving dif-
fering political perspectives, we needed a measure
combining information on the extent to which dis-
cussants represent a differing political perspective, the
frequency of political discussions within each dyad,
and the total number of dyads formed through that
context. If workers converse with like-minded others
who hold similar political views, then the capacity for
these interactions to enrich democratic dialogue
would be limited. Likewise if the frequency of politi-
cal discussion is low, then the potential for such dis-
cussion to contribute toward a public sphere would be
limited. And even if both dissimilarity and frequency
are high for the average dyad from a given social
context, this will matter little if very few dyads come
from that context. Ultimately our case must rest on
the type of political discussions that transpire in the
workplace, as well as their frequency, and the number
of discussants with whom such discussions transpire.
The Total Exposure to Disagreement measure takes
into account the extent of disagreement with discus-
sant dyads in each context as shown in column 4, and
the frequency of political discussion with each discus-
sant, as shown in column 3. This weighted measure
shown in column 5 is then converted into an indica-
tor of Total Exposure to Disagreement in the social
context by taking into account the proportion of all
discussion dyads that come from that context (shown
in column 1).
Is there more cross-cutting political discussion in
workplaces than other contexts? As the last column of
Table 1 reveals, the workplace excels as a locus for
cross-cutting political discussion. In the South Bend
survey, Total Exposure to Disagreement in the work-
place is significantly greater relative to all other social
contexts. In column five, we see that workplace dyads
in South Bend equal or surpass those from other con-
texts in terms of frequent, cross-cutting political dis-
course. In the final column, upon taking into account
the fact that nearly half of nonrelative discussants
come from the workplace, we see that the typical indi-
vidual is exposed to far more disagreement at work
than elsewhere. Because residents of South Bend may
not provide a representative picture of the nation as a
whole, the Spencer and CNEP surveys are of particu-
lar interest. In the summary scales for the Spencer
survey, we again see evidence of greater amounts of
political discussion involving disagreement at work.
All other social contexts provide significantly less
cross-cutting political discussion than the workplace.
The one comparison that does not achieve statistical
significance corresponds to those who met “through a
friend.” It is difficult to know what context is implied
by this reference, but it is notable that the same general
pattern is also in evidence in the far right column for
the CNEP survey. In these data, we see that the work-
place fosters significantly more cross-cutting political
discussion than churches or neighborhoods, but the
“other” category, while lower, is not significantly so.
Overall, these findings corroborate our hypothesis
about the unique nature of the workplace. Relative to
other tangible social contexts, the workplace is home
to a great deal more political discussion that crosses
lines of political difference.
A closer look at the additional data in Table 1 sug-
gests why the workplace fares so well relative to other
social contexts. First, as shown in the initial column,
the workplace is the leading source of political 
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T 1 Political Disagreement in Nonrelative Discussion Dyads, by Social Context
5. Extent of
disagreement
in dyads 
2. Average 3. Average weighted by 6. Total
1. Percent of frequency frequency 4. Average dyad-level exposure to
nonrelative of of political extent of frequency of disagreement
discussion discussion discussion disagreement political by social
partners in dyads in dyads in dyads discussion contextb
1984 South Bend Study
Workplace (N = 1,077) 48.0 2.48 1.24 1.58 2.10 1.01
Groups (215) 9.6*** 1.86*** 1.33# 1.37** 2.04 .20***
Neighbors (423) 18.9*** 1.99*** 1.20 1.30*** 1.76*** .33***
Met via relatives (236) 10.5*** 1.92*** 1.24 1.46# 1.87* .20***
School (85) 3.8*** 2.16*** 1.35 1.44 1.98 .08***
Casual acquaintance (208) 9.3*** 1.93*** 1.32 1.50 2.19 .20***
1996 Spencer Foundation Study
Workplace (N = 450) 35.2 2.21 1.88 4.22 1.49
Vol. associations (61) 4.8*** 2.25 1.31*** 3.10* .15***
Through a friend (416) 32.5 2.17 1.80 4.11 1.34
Grew up together (147) 11.5*** 2.46* 1.69 4.23 .49***
Neighbors (81) 6.5*** 1.96# 1.51 3.57 .23***
Other (123) 9.6*** 1.98* 1.33*** 3.27** .31***
1992 Cross-National Election Project
Workplace (N = 498) 33.2 1.89 1.74 3.36 1.12
Church (197) 13.1*** 1.69** 1.23*** 2.17*** .28***
Neighbors (250) 16.7*** 1.80 1.67 3.13 .52***
Other (555) 37.0 1.84 1.51*** 2.85*** 1.05
1985 General Social Surveya
Workplace (N = 663) 32.2 2.55
Groups (423) 20.5*** 2.16**
Neighbors (316) 15.3*** 2.32
Advisors (334) 16.2*** 1.81***
Other (746) 36.2 2.09
1987 General Social Surveya
Workplace (N = 417) 28.4 2.67
Groups (288) 19.6*** 2.33#
Neighbors (279) 19.0*** 2.36#
Advisors (407) 27.7 2.20***
Other (394) 26.8 2.23***
2000 National Election Studya
Workplace (N = 793) 48.4 1.91
Church (229) 14.0*** 2.02
Neighbors (442) 27.0*** 2.03**
Other (403) 24.3*** 2.03**
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; #p < .10.
Note: All significance tests are based on contrasts between the workplace and the other contexts. There are 1,534 respondents on the
1985 GSS, 91.1% of whom named at least one discussion partner. Corresponding values for the others surveys are: 1987 GSS N = 1,466
(94.1%); 1984 South Bend (c wave) N = 1,512 (94.3%); 1996 Spencer N = 780 (90.0%); 1992 CNEP N = 1,318 (91.4%); 2000 NES 
N = 1,551 (74.3%).
aPercentages in column 1 sum to greater than 100 because GSS and NES respondents could name multiple categories for each discus-
sion partner. Data are coded such that overlapping membership is permitted for all categories except the “Other” category, which includes
only non-relative discussion partners who are not known to respondents through other identified social contexts.
bTotal exposure was constructed by weighting the dyad-level figures in column 5 by the total number of dyads that came from that social
context, as shown by the percentages in column 1. Thus the highest total exposure to disagreement in a social context would be pro-
duced by a high extent of disagreement, coupled with a high frequency of political discussion, and many dyads from that particular social
context.
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discussion partners on five of the six surveys, and a
close second on the sixth, the 1985 GSS. Although the
“Other” categories on the two GSS surveys and the
CNEP and the “Met through a friend” category on 
the Spencer battery are not significantly different from
the workplace, in every instance in which the workplace
is contrasted with another specific context, the workplace
not only supplied a greater number of discussion part-
ners, but also did so by a statistically significant margin.
This evidence is especially impressive given that many
respondents are not employed. If we were to make
these same comparisons strictly among those who
work and who thus have the opportunity to find dis-
cussants in this venue, the workplace would stand out
to an even greater extent.
But as the additional columns in Table 1 make
clear, this relative advantage is not purely a function
of the large number of people with whom workers
interact on the job. Dyads formed through the work-
place are also most likely to involve people of disparate
political perspectives. Across all three surveys, the
fourth column shows that the average extent of dis-
agreement is consistently greatest for the workplace,
though the differences are not always significant. In
South Bend respondents perceived the highest level of
political disagreement with discussion partners whom
they met through work. Political disagreement with
workplace discussants was perceived to be greater than
for people met through groups (p < .01), neighbors 
(p < .001), and those met through relatives (p < .10).
Only those whose origin was described as simply a
“casual social acquaintance” rivaled the extent of dis-
agreement offered by workplace discussants. People
known through groups or through the neighborhood
do particularly poorly when it comes to providing
political disagreement.
A more extensive, five-item index of political dis-
similarity confirmed this same pattern in the Spencer
study. Discussants from the workplace were more
likely than those from other contexts to be described
as disagreeing when discussing politics, opposing
rather than sharing their political views, holding views
that were generally different from those of the respon-
dent, and to be of a differing political party and to
have voted for a different presidential candidate.
Similar to results from the South Bend study, volun-
tary associations were perceived to provide very little
exposure to dissimilar political views in the national
sample. Likewise, in the CNEP data, levels of dis-
agreement were highest among discussants from the
workplace relative to those from other contexts. Dis-
agreement with discussants from church, the only
voluntary association included on the CNEP, was par-
ticularly rare, corroborating the basic pattern from the
South Bend and Spencer studies.
At first glance, data on the frequency of political
discussion in the third column of Table 1 are mixed.
Although coworker dyads yield the highest frequency
levels of any context in three of the surveys, most of
these differences do not reach statistical significance,
and three of the comparisons suggest that other con-
texts may produce a slightly higher frequency of dis-
cussion. On deeper inspection, however, these data
may mask the significance of the workplace by virtue
of the way questions were asked. In South Bend, for
instance, frequency of political discussion was meas-
ured by asking “When you talk with [name], about
how often do you discuss politics? Do you discuss pol-
itics most times that you talk with him/her, fairly
often, only once in a while, or never?” Similar items
were used on the Spencer, CNEP, and NES surveys.
Vague quantifiers that ask for the relative frequency of
an event are notoriously difficult to interpret as
absolute frequencies (Schaeffer 1991). The absolute
frequency implied by a relative frequency statement
depends on how often the general event occurs
(Pepper and Prytulak 1974). The proportion of con-
versations that have political content is comparable 
in the workplace and elsewhere, but there are more
actual conversations—and more discussion part-
ners—at work, and therefore more political discus-
sion. Hence, the workplace gains its relative advantage
by virtue of the high number of conversations in
general that take place there, not by politics dominat-
ing as a topic of discussion. This interpretation is re-
inforced by data from the 1987 GSS. There, the
frequency of political discussion was measured using
an item that directly tapped absolute frequency,
ranging from never to almost daily. Measured in this
manner, we see that political discussion occurs sig-
nificantly more often at work than elsewhere.
Overall then, it is the large number of political
discussants from work, combined with the political
diversity of discussants from the workplace and the
volume of conversation at work that makes it such
fertile territory for political discourse. Taken together,
these indicators make a strong case for the workplace
as an important context for cross-cutting political
interaction. The advantage of testing our first hypoth-
esis using network discussion batteries designed for
more general purposes is that respondents were asked
questions that were neutral with respect to social
context, so it is unlikely they were prompted to think
about what happens at work as opposed to any other
social context. Moreover, since the measures we devel-
oped for purposes of summary comparison were con-
      -   
structed from independent assessments of own and
network members’ political predispositions, political
discussion frequencies, and so forth, respondents were
not aware that comparisons by social context were
being made when describing their networks.
Nonetheless, it is also of interest to hear respon-
dents’ subjective impressions of how much they are
exposed to diverse political perspectives in different
social contexts. In the Spencer study, tests based on the
discussants named by each respondent were aug-
mented by additional comparisons. Respondents were
asked the same five questions that they were asked
about each discussant’s political leanings, frequency 
of discussion, and so forth, but in this case about
members of a randomly selected voluntary association
to which they belonged, and about the people with
whom they interacted at work. These questions
focused attention directly on discussants in these two
contexts, regardless of whether these contexts had
come up when respondents named their three main
political discussants as part of the general network
battery. The same measure of extent of disagreement
depicted in column 4 of Table 1 was roughly twice as
high for the workplace as for voluntary associations,
and significantly different. Thus, whether these ques-
tions are asked in terms of specific individuals, or
more globally about people at work or people in a
group to which the respondent belongs, the results
look the same. Data from multiple sources provide
strong corroboration of the hypothesis that the work-
place surpasses other contexts as a locus for cross-
cutting political discourse.4
To summarize, discussion of politics is not off
limits at work. On the contrary, discussion of poten-
tially controversial topics appears to thrive in the
American workplace. What remains to be determined
is what consequences arise from these conversations.
Previous research has identified tangible benefits of
cross-cutting political discussion more generally (e.g.,
Mutz 2002), but questions linger regarding whether
political discussion in the workplace yields these same
effects.
Does Workplace-Based Political
Interaction Promote Deliberative
Goals?
In this study, the data provide opportunities to
examine two potential consequences of the fact that
interactions on the job expose workers to diverse
viewpoints. We first consider effects on individuals’
levels of awareness of rationales for opposing political
viewpoints. Awareness of rationales for oppositional
views has been posited as a general product of politi-
cal exchanges that involve disagreement (Mutz 2002;
Price, Cappella, and Nir 2002), but it remains to be
seen whether conversations around the water cooler
can serve this same purpose. Second, we also evaluate
effects on political tolerance, because tolerance has
been widely asserted to flow from contact among
people of differing views, either because of the infor-
mation exchanged during informal contact, or
because of the relationships that form across lines of
difference. In a recent meta-analysis of intergroup
contact findings, the workplace was noted as the social
context most conducive to beneficial intergroup
contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2000). Working together
potentially creates favorable conditions for fostering
the kind of cross-cutting contact that leads to an
understanding of diverse perspectives.
In our analyses we go beyond the descriptive asso-
ciations between employment and democratic values
documented by others to evaluate the proposed mech-
anism of influence that is typically asserted to account
for these relationships—informal political discussion
among nonlike-minded coworkers. In addition, we
offer better operationalizations of the independent
variable in order to more closely approximate the phe-
nomenon widely assumed to play the key role in estab-
lishing this relationship—the extent of cross-cutting
political discourse that takes place at work. If cross-
cutting political conversation is, indeed, central to this
process, then we would expect to find that workers
exposed to a great deal of cross-cutting conversation
through their workplaces should exhibit more of these
consequences than those exposed to less of it. We next
draw on all available social network surveys that allow
us some purchase on this hypothesis. In total, these
data made it possible to conduct five independent tests
of the relationship between cross-cutting political dis-
cussion in the workplace and consequences relevant to
a healthy public sphere.
Awareness of Rationales for Opposing Viewpoints.
The Spencer data permit us to test whether political
4In the analyses conducted thus far, no distinctions have 
been made regarding occupation type. Although the workplace 
as a whole may foster cross-cutting political discourse, one 
might speculate on systematic variance across workplaces. We
examined this matter using South Bend and CNEP data for
employed respondents, with data disaggregated following the
occupation categories developed by the Bureau of the Census.
Estimated marginal means were virtually identical across occupa-
tion categories, and in no instance was a statistically significant
difference detected.
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conversations with nonlike-minded coworkers
increased awareness of rationales for opposing politi-
cal views. To tap awareness of rationales for differing
viewpoints, a series of items assessed respondents’
opinions on three issues, including state versus federal
control of welfare, affirmative action, and the 1996
presidential candidates. After each issue, respondents
were asked to mention any reasons they could in
support of either issue position. Independent coders
then assessed the number of unique arguments
respondents generated in support of their own issue
position, and in support of the opposing position. To
create general indicators of respondents’ levels of
awareness of the rationales supporting their own issue
positions, we summed the number of arguments in
support of each respondent’s own positions across the
three issues. This indicator served as an important
control variable.5 Likewise, we created our dependent
variable by combining the unique arguments gener-
ated for opposing points of view across the three 
controversies.
To produce respondent-level measures of the
cross-cutting political conversation encountered
through work, we used the summary measures of how
frequently each respondent was exposed to political
conversation at work, and the indicator summarizing
the extent to which people at work were in political
agreement or disagreement with the main respondent;
the resulting variable is recoded to range in value from
0 to 1. A second respondent-level operationalization
of exposure to cross-cutting views at work was created
by summing the dyad-level measures shown in
column 5 of Table 1 across all of each respondent’s dis-
cussants that came from the workplace. Observations
on this variable take on values between 0 and 18.
We hypothesized that greater awareness of ratio-
nales for opposing views would result from the polit-
ical discussion across lines of difference that takes
place at work. In other words, communication across
lines of difference among coworkers should promote
an awareness of the legitimate bases of political con-
flict. But it is important to disentangle this hypothe-
sized effect from plausible rival explanations, such as
the possibility that political discussion more generally
has these beneficial effects. For these reasons we also
included an indicator of the general frequency with
which each respondent discussed politics at work, and
another variable indicating the average frequency of
political discussion in the respondent’s general dis-
cussion network, including discussion partners from
all social contexts.
Given that politically sophisticated respondents
are likely to generate more unique arguments for
oppositional viewpoints as a result of higher informa-
tion levels, it is important to control for political
knowledge. Those who happened to be interested in
the particular issues used to form our dependent vari-
able would be expected to score higher as a result as
well, so we include awareness of rationales for one’s
own opinion on these same issues as a control vari-
able. It would not be surprising, nor particularly
informative, to find that high levels of political dis-
cussion go hand in hand with high levels of informa-
tion about political issues. But by controlling for
general political knowledge,6 as well as for issue-
specific knowledge, we eliminate substantial variance
extraneous to our research question. Our model also
includes controls for age, education, sex, race, marital
status, partisanship, and ideology.7 Because our
dependent variable is a count variable with a prepon-
derance of zeroes and ones (59%), we analyzed these
data using Poisson regression.
Table 2 provides two tests, one using measures of
the overall extent of political disagreement in the
workplace as the key independent variable, and the
second drawing on the network dyad measures aggre-
gated across each respondent as described above.8 The
5In order for respondents’ arguments to be coded as rationales for
opposing views or for their own views, respondents needed to have
nonneutral preferences on the issues. For example, if a respondent
took a neutral stance on one of the three issues and a nonneutral
stance on the other two, then the score for the dependent variable
is a count of opposing rationales for the latter two issues, with no
additional arguments added for the third, since it cannot be deter-
mined which side is consistent with the respondent’s own views.
Thus scores on the dependent variable will vary partly as a func-
tion of the number of neutral stances taken by respondents. To
control for the fact that some respondents did not have opinions
for some issues, the model includes as a control variable the
number of issues on which the respondent took a nonneutral
stance.
6Political knowledge is operationalized as a count of correct
answers on the five-item scale developed by Delli Carpini and
Keeter (1996). For some dependent variables, such a scale per-
forms inadequately because it fails to capture the differential
effects of incorrect versus “don’t know” responses (Mondak 2001).
To confirm that the dependent variable used here is not suscepti-
ble to this problem, we ran an alternate model in which we sub-
stituted counts of incorrect and “don’t know” responses for the
political knowledge scale. The test variables failed to produce dif-
fering effects.
7We omit income as a control variable from this and subsequent
multivariate analyses in order to preserve a more representative
sample, but in no case did it alter the pattern of findings we
observed. Although a question addressing union membership was
also available in these data, it made no contribution to any of the
models in any of these analyses, and thus was also omitted.
8Because several of the predictors in Table 2 directly or indirectly
involve information levels (education, political knowledge,
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results reported in the first column of Table 2 demon-
strate that it is not the overall frequency of political
discussion, nor even the general frequency of political
discussion at work, that matters for purposes of pro-
moting an awareness of oppositional views. Instead, it
is the extent of political disagreement in the workplace
that has the most impressive effect on respondents’
understanding of oppositional viewpoints.9 In the
second column, we see that using the network-based
measures produces similar results. The dependent
variable has a mean value of 1.45. With other variables
held constant at their means, predicted values of
awareness of oppositional views increase from 1.05 to
1.71 across the range of our first indicator of exposure
to cross-cutting communication in the workplace, and
T 2 Cross-Cutting Discussion in the Workplace and Awareness of Rationales for Opposing Views
Model 1 Model 2
Constant -2.85*** -2.42***
(.36) (.34)
Democrat .08 .11
(.11) (.11)
Republican -.05 -.05
(.11) (.11)
Liberal -.06 -.04
(.05) (.05)
Conservative -.03 -.01
(.04) (.04)
Political knowledge .09* .09*
(.04) (.04)
Number of issues on which respondent has an opinion .46*** .41***
(.10) (.10)
Awareness of rationales supporting own issue positions .06** .06**
(.02) (.02)
General frequency of political discussion .05 .06
(.05) (.05)
Frequency of political discussion at work .09#
(.05)
Extent of political disagreement within workplace .49*
(.19)
Frequency of political discussion in workplace discussion networks .00
(.02)
Extent of political disagreement in workplace discussion network, weighted by .03*
frequency of political discussion in dyads (.01)
c2 207.43 186.65
Pseudo R2 .32 .30
Number of cases 400 379
Source: 1996 Spencer Survey, workers only.
Note: Cell entries are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a count of the number
of rationales offered by respondents for issue positions opposite of the positions held by the respondents. Models include controls for
age, education, sex, race and marital status.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; #p < .10.
number of issues on which respondent has an opinion, awareness
of rationales supporting own issue positions), we initially were
concerned about possible collinearity. However, two factors
assuaged this concern. First, all of the variables in question yield
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that any adverse
effect of collinearity on standard errors is not so great as to prevent
detection of significant effects. Second, diagnostic tests revealed
that collinearity is minimal. For example, when each independent
variable in Table 2 is regressed on all other predictors, the highest
R2 value, which is obtained when political knowledge is the
dependent variable, is only .42.
9To ensure that Poisson regression was appropriate, we estimated
a negative binomial model and contrasted it with the Poisson spec-
ification. The negative binomial model’s overdispersion parame-
ter was insignificant. For the respondents in this analysis, the
dependent variable was mean = 1.45, s.d. = 1.56, and the frequen-
cies are 0 (35.3%), 1 (23.9), 2 (20.1), 3 (10.6), 4 and higher (10.2;
highest observed value is 11).
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from 1.24 to 2.13 for the second measure. The influ-
ence of cross-cutting discourse is over and above the
significant effect associated with general frequency of
political discussion and the effect of frequency of
political discussion within the workplace. In both
columns, we see evidence of the mechanism we have
proposed for employment’s beneficial effects. Regard-
less of how we operationalize it, the extent of dis-
agreement encountered in discussions at work is
important to an understanding of “the other side.”
Political Tolerance. Two of the surveys made it pos-
sible to evaluate consequences of cross-cutting work-
place discourse for political tolerance. Both the 1985
GSS and the 1996 Spencer survey included tolerance
items as well as network measures, although they
differ in the measurement strategies used and in the
level of detail available in the indicators. The GSS 
uses a modified Stouffer tolerance battery, while the
Spencer survey includes a content-controlled measure
consistent with Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982).
In the GSS, the tolerance measure is a count of how
many controversial acts respondents would tolerate,
ranging from 0 to 15. On the Spencer survey, tolerance
is an index constructed as an average of six tolerance
items, each ranging from one to four.
Although neither data set offers the ideal set of
variables for testing the tolerance hypothesis, we rea-
soned that if consistent results were found using data
from two different surveys, with two forms of the
dependent variable, and different means of opera-
tionalizing the independent variable, then we would
be able to offer a more definitive statement regarding
the link between talking politics at work and political
tolerance than from a single test. At a minimum, our
analyses have the potential to move theoretical insight
and empirical support for the effects of workplace
interaction well beyond the simple association
between working and tolerance that has been previ-
ously noted.
With the Spencer survey we can isolate the fre-
quency of political discussion and of political dis-
agreement, specifically with those known through
work. These items allow us to differentiate the poten-
tial consequences of frequent discussion, and discus-
sion that is nonlike-minded in perspective. As in the
analyses of awareness of rationales for oppositional
views, we include a large number of control variables
to rule out plausible spurious relationships, including
the frequency of political discussion in the work-
place, and the average frequency of interaction 
with members of respondents’ general discussion 
networks.
As shown in Table 3, tolerance varies as a function
of the frequency of political discussion at work, but
even more so due to exposure to political disagree-
ment at work. Consistent with the theory predicting
this relationship, the nature and content of inter-
actions is most pertinent for political tolerance.
Evidence in the first column suggests that workplace-
based political discussion has positive implications for
political tolerance.10 Because the indicator of exposure
to disagreement at work has values between 0 and 1,
the .37 coefficient corresponds with a shift in value of
.37 points on the tolerance dependent variable, or
better than half a standard deviation, across the range
of the workplace variable. In the second column of
Table 3, the independent measures based on each
respondent’s aggregated dyads fail to produce consis-
tent results. Here neither Frequency of political dis-
cussion nor Extent of difference weighted by
frequency produce significant findings.
We formulated one additional test of the conse-
quences of political conversations at work based on
the 1985 GSS data. Unfortunately, the GSS discussion
battery did not include direct assessment of exposure
to disagreement, thus we had to settle for an indirect,
imperfect proxy. We know from Table 1 that work-
place dyads bring individuals into contact with
persons of diverse social and political views, so it
follows that the highest probability of exposure to dis-
agreement at work will be among respondents with
the largest number of discussants from work, as
opposed to discussants from other social contexts.
While dyads from other contexts certainly can con-
tribute to cross-cutting exposure, workplace discus-
sants should stand out in this regard.
Thus, in the analysis in Table 4, we treat the
number of discussants each respondent draws from
the workplace as a proxy for the extent of cross-cutting
political conversation at work. The Spencer data
provide an opportunity to gauge just how close a
proxy the number of workplace-based discussants is
likely to be for this item. In that survey the number of
discussants from the workplace and direct assessment
of the extent of cross-cutting conversation at work
10Research on the composition of workplace discussion networks
corroborates our claim of a causal relationship between exposure
to disagreement and political tolerance. For causality to be speci-
fied incorrectly it would have to be that individuals high in toler-
ance seek out disagreement in political discourse. However, the
composition of the context, not a worker’s own views, is the
primary force influencing network composition in the workplace
(Mondak and Mutz 2001), and respondents reported that discus-
sants initiated a preponderance of conversations about politics,
often against the wishes of the respondents.
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were closely correlated (r = .82, p < .001). The strength
of this relationship between a direct measure and its
proxy gives us confidence in the measure we use with
GSS data.
In order to take into account other network influ-
ences, additional predictors were included, represent-
ing the number of political discussion dyads drawn
from within the family (all relatives, including
spouses), from group members (excluding relatives
and coworkers), and from other nonrelatives. Because
the workplace facilitates cross-cutting political dis-
course more than these other contexts, and we
hypothesize that this exposure promotes tolerance, we
expected the number of political discussants who 
are coworkers to be positively related to political 
tolerance.
This analysis still leaves open the possibility that
working people (who naturally have more discussants
from that context than nonworkers do) are more tol-
erant than nonworkers because of some third variable
promoting a spurious association between working
and tolerant attitudes. To eliminate this possibility, we
include a dummy variable in the model representing
whether a respondent works outside the home.
Consistent with our expectations, Table 4 suggests
that working promotes political tolerance and that
political discussion at work is especially valuable
toward that end. Tolerance rises sharply as a function
of the number of discussion partners from work. A
person who named five discussants from work scores,
on average, nearly three points higher on the GSS tol-
erance measure than someone with no workplace dis-
cussion partners. Discussions with relatives and group
members yield no such effects. The coefficient for
other nonrelatives is statistically significant, but
smaller in magnitude than the effect for coworkers.
The workplace is the leading context for exposure to
cross-cutting political discourse; discussion with rela-
tives and group members does not expose individuals
to diverse points of view, and discussion with friends
and casual acquaintances brings only moderate expo-
sure to political diversity. With those data in mind, the
T 3 The Impact of Cross-Cutting Discussion in the Workplace on Political Tolerance
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 1.15*** 1.47***
(.20) (.18)
Democrat -.07 -.07
(.08) (.08)
Republican -.14# -.13
(.08) (.08)
Liberal .04 .03
(.04) (.04)
Conservative -.04 -.04
(.03) (.03)
Political knowledge .16*** .16***
(.03) (.03)
General frequency of political discussion .04 .06
(.04) (.04)
Frequency of political discussion at work .08*
(.04)
Extent of political disagreement within workplace .37*
(.16)
Frequency of political discussion in workplace discussion networks -.01
(.02)
Extent of political disagreement in workplace discussion network, weighted by frequency .00
of political discussion in dyads (.01)
R2 .30 .27
Number of cases 381 360
Source: 1996 Spencer Survey, workers only.
Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is political tolerance meas-
ured via a least-like group protocol. Models include controls for age, education, sex, race and marital status.
***p < .001; *p < .05; #p < .10.
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results in Table 4 strongly support the hypothesis that
exposure to incongruent perspectives is positively
related to political tolerance.11 It is also worth noting
that those who do not work outside of the home tend
to be less tolerant than those who are employed, thus
suggesting that even after taking into account any
general characteristics that differ between those who
work and those who do not, our crude indicators of
cross-cutting exposure help identify part of what it is
that is beneficial about the workplace.
Political tolerance is about putting up with people
whose ideas we reject. For many individuals, this is
exactly what is required in the workplace. Coworkers
must spend a great deal of time together and engage
in cooperative endeavors. Because it is a fertile envi-
ronment for the expression of diverse political per-
spectives, the workplace compels incongruent
experiences of the precise sort hypothesized to
promote legitimacy and political tolerance. The
Spencer and GSS results jointly provide corroboration
for this proposition in four out of the five tests we were
able to construct. Using data from two independent
national surveys, and with different specifications of
both the dependent variable and the key independent
variable, these tests confirm that workplace-based dis-
cussion is capable of promoting democratically valu-
able consequences. Whether we compare those with
political discussants drawn from work versus those
from other contexts or compare workers in more and
less politically agreeable work environments and
social networks, cross-cutting discussions in the work-
place have beneficial consequences.
How confident should we be that the relationships
identified in Tables 2, 3, and 4 represent causal influ-
ences? The analysis predicting awareness of opposi-
tional perspectives in Table 2 is, if anything, a
conservative specification given that it isolates a very
specific kind of awareness by including controls for
awareness of rationales on one’s own side of the issues,
and extremity of opinion, as well as general political
knowledge, political discussion frequency, and politi-
cal interest. Reverse causation also seems implausible
in this case, since there is little reason to expect that
being aware of oppositional viewpoints will lead 
one to discuss politics more with nonlike-minded
coworkers.12
T 4 The Impact of Workplace Discussants
and Employment Status on Political
Tolerance
Standard
Coefficient Error
Constant 3.22*** .71
Democrat -.68* .28
Republican -.45 .29
Liberal .95** .29
Conservative -.67* .27
Number of discussants .06 .09
who are relatives
Number of discussants -.23 .18
who are nonrelative
group members
Number of discussants .56*** .14
who are nonrelative
coworkers
Number of discussants .36** .12
who are other
nonrelatives
Respondent does not -.60* .27
work outside of the
home
R2 .30
Number of cases 1,527
Source: 1985 General Social Survey.
Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients, with t-values in
parentheses. The dependent variable is political tolerance as meas-
ured using the GSS modified Stouffer battery (0 = low tolerance
to 15 = high tolerance). The model includes controls for age, edu-
cation, sex, race and marital status.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
11In addition to the OLS model reported in Table 4, we explored
two alternate modeling strategies for the GSS tolerance data. First,
because the 0 to 15 scale represents a count of responses on a series
of dichotomous items, we estimated a negative binomial model
(this model’s overdispersion parameter was significant, indicating
that a Poisson approach is inappropriate). As in the OLS model,
the count of discussants from the workplace emerged as a highly
significant predictor in the negative binomial model (b = .11, s.e.
= .03, p < .001), but the dummy for employment status produced
an insignificant effect (b = .07, s.e. = .06). Second, with scale values
on the dependent variable reversed (0 = maximum tolerance, 15
= maximum intolerance), we estimated a zero-inflated negative
binomial model. Mondak and Sanders (2003) argue that this strat-
egy permits differentiation of the presence or absence of intoler-
ance from variance in levels of intolerance. In the current case,
results of a Vuong test do, in fact, indicate the superiority of the
zero-inflated specification relative to the conventional negative
binomial model. In this model, the number of discussion partners
from work produced a significant effect in the count equation,
suggesting a strong relationship to levels of intolerance (b = -.09,
s.e. = .02, p < .001), but an insignificant effect in the zero-inflated
equation. Conversely, employment status produced a moderate
effect only in the zero-inflated equation (-.50, s.e. = .21, p < .05).
12An anonymous reviewer suggests that understanding of opposi-
tional perspectives may make one more secure, and thus more
willing to seek out political disagreement. Although this is possi-
ble, it also possible that prior understanding of opposing views
alerts some individuals to positions they find objectionable, and
thus discourages subsequent exposure to disagreement. Absent
evidence to the contrary, we see it as unlikely that either of these
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These kinds of considerations should be more of
a concern in the analyses of tolerance in Tables 3 and
4. Here it is plausible either that tolerance makes
people more likely to talk about politics with nonlike-
minded coworkers, or that a spurious relationship is
present, perhaps as a result of some unmeasured char-
acteristic such as open-mindedness, which could drive
both tolerance and the willingness to talk to cowork-
ers of opposing political views. Our concern for this
latter possibility led us to conduct a final empirical
test. If, as we have suggested, tolerance drives people’s
willingness to talk with those of opposing views at
work, or some characteristic such as open-minded-
ness causes both tolerance and willingness to talk with
those of opposing views at work, then it follows that
these same tolerant/open-minded people should also
be more likely to discuss politics across lines of dif-
ference in other, nonwork-related, contexts. Interest-
ingly, this is not the case.13 This result leads us to
believe that the extent of cross-cutting exposure one
experiences at work has less to do with individual
choice and extent of tolerance and has more to do
with structural features of one’s work environment
that promote cross-cutting exposure. This overall
pattern gives us increased confidence in our assertion
that cross-cutting political conversations at work
promote political tolerance.
Discussion
Work is about more than producing widgets and
bringing home the bacon. In the process of perform-
ing instrumental functions in their places of employ-
ment, people experience important incidental
exposure to political ideas that differ from their own.
Our analyses examining the extent to which citizens
engage in political communication converge on one
central conclusion: Of all contexts with the potential for
political interaction, the workplace currently has the
greatest capacity for exposing people to political dialogue
across lines of political difference. Despite the many
reasons one might avoid talking about politics at
work, our evidence consistently points to the work-
place as a key context for cross-cutting social interac-
tions. The workplace surpasses other social contexts in
the number of political discussants it provides. And
most importantly, cross-cutting political discourse
flourishes with discussants from the workplace.
In addition, our findings go beyond documenting
the extent of cross-cutting interactions at work to
show that these discussions do, indeed, have some
measurable consequences. Even though these
exchanges are unlikely to involve the kind of in-depth
discussion that theorists might advocate, cross-cutting
interactions at work nonetheless lead to greater aware-
ness of the rationales for views other than one’s own.
By learning about their coworkers’ views and pers-
pectives, people gain a better understanding of the
legitimate bases of political conflict. In addition,
cross-cutting exposure in the workplace may lead to
greater political tolerance. The experience of talking
with politically dissimilar others may serve to increase
workers’ appreciation for the rights of groups with
whom they personally disagree.
Although the specific reasons that the workplace
facilitates cross-cutting discourse warrant additional
study, several unique aspects of the workplace are
already apparent. First, relationships in the workplace
are characterized by frequent, regular contact. People
spend a great deal of time at work, typically in the
presence of others. This reality fosters casual conver-
sation, including casual conversation about politics.
Second, workers tend to have little or no say in the
composition of their workforce, yet both formal and
informal forces encourage them to get along. Hence,
not only is self-selection minimal, there also is an
involuntary component to social interaction in the
workplace. Third, this sense of “involuntary associa-
tion” extends to the dyad level. Survey respondents
overwhelmingly hold that political topics are fair
game in the workplace, and yet many workers indicate
that they often are reluctantly, yet unavoidably, drawn
into conversations about politics (Mondak and Mutz
2001). In other contexts—the neighborhood, the
church, the association, and so on—people are not
required to spend long hours in the company of others
who are not of their choosing. Fourth, the weak social
ties that typically characterize relationships among
coworkers may make it easier to acknowledge dis-
agreements than acknowledging them with close
social ties such as friends and family. Close friends and
family are likely to be in agreement in any case, but
when they are not, political differences of opinion can
seem threatening among intimates. Finally, although
we did not test for such effects here, it is entirely plau-
sible that the workplace also exposes individuals to
dynamics operate with much prevalence, and thus the most plau-
sible explanation for the effect we have identified is that exposure
to disagreement fosters understanding of oppositional views.
13This test focused on the 294 Spencer respondents for whom there
are both workplace and nonworkplace nonrelative discussants. For
these, the average disagreement x frequency score per discussant
among workplace and nonworkplace discussants is correlated at
an insignificant -.03.
  .    . 
nonverbal signals that reinforce or complement the
effects of political discussion we identify.
Perhaps more than any other social context, the
workplace serves as a setting in which casual discus-
sions of politics transpire among people of opposing
views. But this is not to say that the workplace forms
a perfect substitute for the street corner or that all
workplaces necessarily are equal in fostering cross-
cutting political exchange. In light of the general
attributes of workplace-based political discussion
identified here, we think the political socialization 
of citizens that takes place through people’s work 
lives is clearly deserving of further study. Past 
scholarly inattention to the workplace means that 
the consequences of political communication in 
this context remain largely unexamined or they are
severely limited by available data. Scholars have
assessed the role of workplace experiences in fostering
the skills needed for political participation and the
time and money that serve as important resources
toward that same end (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady 1995). But we have only begun to examine a few
of the many potential political consequences of par-
ticipation in the workforce. Given the unique features
of the workplace as a context for social interaction,
it is vital that the theoretical benefits of exposure to
dissimilar views be explored more fully. We see it as
particularly important that we improve our under-
standing of what it is about the workplace that enables
cross-cutting interaction and what implications such
interaction has for political behavior outside of the
workplace.
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